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2I. INTRODUCTION
In contrast with the firm operating within a single country whose
financing choices typically are limited to the type of instruments it
issues and the timing of these issues, the multinational firm must decide
on the currency of issue, the jurisdiction of issue, the corporate legal
vehicle through which the issue is made, and, in the case where the funds
are raised in a legal unit different from the one where they are needed,
the form of inter-affiliate transfer of the funds. In making these
choices, the firms must consider the availability of funds, their
relative costs, and the extent to which they either modify or offset the
firm's operating risks. It must take into account not only the tax and
agency cost considerations that determine a desirable overall capital
structure, but interest rates in relation to expectations of currency
movements, the variability of exchange rates and, hence, of financing
costs, actual and potential credit and exchange controls, and the
interaction between financial structure and political risk.
Financing choices require complex trade-offs between the expected
after-tax cost of financing and risk. While these trade-offs can be
subsumed under the overall objective of maximizing the market value of
the firm's shares, they must be formulated more explicitly since they
involve not only the risk of the firm's shares as constituents of
investors' portfolios, but the total risk of the firm as well.
The choice of trade-offs to be made in establishing a worldwide
financial policy requires an explicit analytical framework. Various
authors have proposed solutions to part of this overall problem,l yet
few comprehensive solutions have been suggested. Further, the "total
system" mathematical programming approaches that have been outlined
3typically are far too complex for meaningful application yet omit
important aspects of the problem.2 In this paper, we outline an
overall approach to financing choices which incorporates the most
relevant considerations, yet is relatively simple because it breaks down
the overall problem into several largely separable components.
We separate the special issues of the firm operating internationally
into three subproblems:
1) minimizing taxes,
2) managing currency and political risks, and
3) exploiting financial market distortions.3
These three subproblems, in turn, can be broken down into "passive" and
"active" components, where passive choices are those that do not depend
on special information or forecasting skills and active choices are those
that exploit special information or forecasting skills. In this sense,
both arbitrage and hedging are passive, while speculation is active.
This paper is organized in seven parts. In Part II we discuss the
basic considerations inherent in all financing choices. In Parts III,
IV, and V we develop the three subproblems: minimizing taxes, managing
risks, and exploiting market distortions. In Part VI we discuss the
relation of these three subproblems to the firm's overall capital
structure. Finally, in Part VII we identify the conditions under which
the subproblems are truly separable and draw overall conclusions
regarding financing policy.
4II. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCING CHOICES
The Firm's Objective
We assume that the firm seeks to maximize the market value of its
shares. However, we recognize that this is a complex problem even if we
accept as valid the standard capital asset pricing model (CAPM) for the
firm's home country. 4 This is because the specific risks of a firm's
activities and, hence, the total risk of the equity as residual claim on
the firm feed back to the firm's expected cash flows through financial
distress, including but not limited to the possibility of bankruptcy, as
well as through behavioral impacts on management which can be
characterized as increased agency costs. Thus we specify the objective
function of the firm as
Max V= Y - P(a) (1)
where Vi is the present value of each of the firm's activities
(identifiable cash flow streams) as a constituent in investors'
portfolios in a capital market characterized by the CAPM and P(o) is a
penalty factor reflecting costs of financial distress and agency that are
a function of the total risk of the (present value) of the firm's
residual cash flows.5
The inclusion of a penalty factor that depends on total risk provides
the basis for hedging commodity price and currency risks. Otherwise,
financing choices will depend only on the additive net present values of
each transaction, a far simpler but less realistic problem. The only
relevant choices under such circumstances would be those that either
reduced taxes or were bargains.
5Passive versus Active Policies
Financing choices often involve taking advantage of perceived
bargains as well as reducing taxes or risks. Because of the complexity
of these considerations, however, in many cases the reasons for a
specific choice are not made explicit and one or more of the elements may
be overlooked. A useful way to think about financing choices is to
separate passive from active considerations using the analogy from
investment management. Passive considerations are those that are
relevant even if all financing options are assumed to be fairly
priced--that is, when there are no bargains because markets work well and
the firm has no special information. Active considerations are those
that depend on the ability to spot bargains and take positions to exploit
them.
Passive considerations lead to tax arbitrage and hedging. Active
considerations, in contrast, lead to speculation. Financial market
arbitrage does not fit neatly in the breakdown since it depends on market
distortions, but not necessarily on the special information possessed by
the firm. However, if the definition of passive considerations is
broadened to include all those that don't involve any special
information, then most arbitrage falls into this category as well.
Passive choices logically precede active choices. Thus, in any
situation a firm should first determine what choices it would make if it
had no special information and then decide how far to alter its overall
financing choices to exploit a perceived bargain. This, of course, would
involve a trade-off between the present value of the bargain, taking into
account its systematic risk, and the penalty resulting from its impact on
the total risk of the firm. Again, arbitrage opportunities differ, since
6they have positive net present values and no impact on corporate risk.
As a result, they can be taken in any order with respect to the choices
hinging on passive and active considerations.
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7III. MINIMIZING TAXES
The asymmetrical tax treatment of various components of financial
cost such as dividend payments versus interest expenses and exchange
losses versus exchange gains often means that equality of before-tax
costs will lead to inequality in after-tax costs. Moreover, the U.S. and
various European countries impose withholding taxes on dividends and
interest paid to foreign investors by domestic corporations, leading to a
proliferation of foreign finance subsidiaries designed to avoid this
additional tax burden.
Financing choices aimed at reducing taxes typically have two
components: 1) selecting the tax-minimizing investment, currency,
jurisdiction, and vehicle for external issues and 2) selecting the
tax-favored vehicle and currency for internal (inter-affiliate) financial
transfers to minimize transfer taxes and position profits or losses in
the jurisdiction that will minimize overall income taxes paid. We
discuss each major element in turn.
Structure of External Claims
Choice of Investment. Since interest payments on debt are
tax-deductible whereas dividends are not, there is an incentive to
increase the firm's financial leverage. In addition, since principal
repatriation is tax-free whereas dividend payments may lead to further
taxation, it is clear that parent company financing of its affiliates in
the form of debt rather than equity has certain tax advantages. These
and other factors are discussed in Section VI.
Choice of Currency. International covered interest arbitrage
normally ensures that the annualized forward exchange premium or discount
equals the nominal yield differential between debt denominated in
8different currencies. Moreover, a rational expectations approach to
exchange rates implies that the forward premium or discount equals the
expected rate of change of the exchange rate adjusted by an appropriate
risk premium.6 Thus, a firm that is not concerned with the total risk
of its cash flows would be indifferent between issuing debt in one
currency or another. The presence of taxes, however, may distort the
interest arbitrage relationship from the perspective of the firm since
its tax situation may differ from that of the marginal transactions in
the market. For example, Shapiro [1978] has shown that if arbitrage and
speculation equilibrate real yields before tax, then the classic
corporate prescription to issue weak currency debt is always correct on
an after-tax basis from the standpoint of minimizing expected financing
costs, except in the case of a firm operating under the laws of a country
such as Sweden which permits unrealized exchange losses on foreign
currency debt to be recognized immediately for tax purposes while taxes
on exchange gains are deferred until realized.7 Although this doesn't
mean that it is always cheaper for firms based in Sweden to issue hard
currency debt, the fact that Swedish tax law accelerates tax credits for
foreign exchange losses shifts the balance towards borrowing in
currencies likely to appreciate relative to the krona. By contrast,
England is a special case where government regulations reinforce the rule
to borrow in a weak local currency. This is because England's Inland
Revenue will not permit exchange losses on the principal amount of
foreign currency loans to be tax-deductible.
Choice of Jurisdiction. To the extent that the choice of currency to
be borrowed can be separated from the choice of the country in which the
borrowing takes place or in which the borrowing firm is domiciled, the
9above rule of thumb regarding borrowing weak currencies no longer holds.
The firm will want to borrow so as to maximize its tax deductions. As
long as national tax systems are not indexed for inflation, it clearly
will benefit most by borrowing in the country with the highest inflation
and nominal interest rates in order to maximize interest deductions.
However, only if interest charges and gains or losses on currency
movements are not treated equivalently will this depend on the currency
that is borrowed.
Choice of Vehicle. In the U.S., the withholding tax rate on dividend
and interest payments to foreign investors varies between 0 percent and
30 percent, depending on the bilateral tax treaty with the foreign
country to which these payments. are made. Even though this tax is
nominally paid by the foreign recipient, foreign investors demand a
higher before-tax rate of return as compensation, thus shifting the
incidence of the tax to the security issuer.
The approach taken by many American multinationals to avoid these
taxes is to establish foreign finance subsidiaries. An international
finance subsidiary is a subsidiary incorporated in the U.S. (usually in
Delaware) whose sole purpose is to issue debentures overseas and invest
the proceeds in foreign operations. If less than 20 percent of the gross
income of the finance subsidiary is from U.S. sources (a so-called
"80-20" corporation), the interest paid by the finance subsidiary to its
foreign bondholders will not be subject to U.S. withholding taxes.
Foreign bondholders, however, are still subject to estate taxes. In
addition, if some of the issue is used to finance U.S. operations, then
the 80-20 rule might not be met (i.e., more than 20 percent of its inccine
might come from U.S. sources). For these reasons, many companies have
turned to using offshore financing subsidiaries.
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An offshore finance subsidiary is a wholly-owned affiliate
incorporated overseas, usually in a tax haven country such as Luxembourg,
Switzerland or the Netherland Antilles, whose function is to issue
securities abroad for use in either the parent's domestic or foreign
business. The Netherland Antilles (N.A.) is a particularly attractive
location for such a venture since the bilateral tax treaty between the
U.S. and N.A. specifically exempts interest payments by the finance
subsidiary to foreign bondholders from U.S. withholding tax, even where
100 percent of the finance subsidiary's gross income is derived from U.S.
sources (because proceeds were lent to the parent).
Structure of Internal Transfers
To the extent that tax minimization requires that the firm issue
claims in countries other than where the funds are required, it must
transfer the funds internally. The way this is done will have important
tax implications. If internal financial transfers are "arm's length,"
reflecting external financing costs, then the potential advantages
outlined in the previous section are largely negated. However, by
appropriate choice of the instrument, and in the case of debt claims,
currency and interest rate, withholding taxes on transfers within the
firm can be reduced or avoided and revenues or costs can be shifted to
jurisdictions where they have the most favorable tax consequences.8
- -X^-LII--_IIII_-·-_I_____. 
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IV. MANAGING RISKS
In principle, firms should not try to minimize risks. Rather, they
should take risks whenever they expect to be rewarded for doing so. This
is captured in the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) rule to invest in
all projects whose expected returns exceed the required return given the
projects' systematic risk. The objective function introduced above (eq.
(1)), though, adds a further consideration. To the extent that a
particular risk element adds significantly to a firm's total risk, it
will want to lay off that risk to reduce the penalty factor as long as
the cost of doing so is not too great. If risk contracts are priced
according to the CAPM, for example, transactions shifting such risks will
have zero net present value. Examples of various risks which firms may
seek to lay off include currency risks, potential risks, market risks,
and commodity prices risks. Each is discussed below.
Foreign Exchange Risks
If financing opportunities in various currencies are fairly priced,
firms can structure their liabilities in such a way as to reduce their
exposure to foreign exchange risk at no cost in terms of V i. In the
case of contractual items, this simply involves matching net positive
positions in each currency with borrowing of similar maturity, with the
goal being to offset unanticipated changes in the home currency value of
operating cash flows with identical changes in the home currency cost of
servicing its liabilities. With non-contractual operating cash flows,
the same principle applies although perfect hedging is impossible due to
the many uncertainties concerning the effects of currency changes on
operating flows and the fact that changes in relative prices across
countries are associated with but not perfectly correlated with
variations in the exchange rate..
12
Political Risk
In contrast to the hedging of exchange risks, where the firm seeks
financing that will offset risks inherent in the business, the use of
financing to reduce political risk typically involves mechanisms to avoid
certain risks, such as those of exchange convertibility, or mechanisms
that actually change the risk itself, as in the case of expropriation or
other direct political act.
Firms can sometimes reduce the risk of currency inconvertibility they
face appropriate inter-affiliate financing. This includes investing
parent funds as debt rather than equity, arranging back-to-back and
parallel loans which interpose a bank between the parent and the
subsidiary, and using local financing to the extent possible.
Another approach used by MNCs to reduce their political risk exposure
is to raise capital for a foreign investment from the host and other
governments, international development agencies, overseas banks, and from
customers, with payment to be provided out of production, rather than
supply parent company raised or guaranteed capital. Since repayment is
tied to the project's success, the firm(s) sponsoring the project can
create an international network of banks, government agencies, and
customers with a vested interest in the faithful fulfillment of the host
government's contract with the sponsoring firm(s). Any expropriation
threat is likely to upset relations with customers, banks, and
governments worldwide. Moran [1973] shows how this strategy was used
successfully by Kennecott to finance a major copper mine expansion in
Chile. Despite the subsequent rise to power of Salvador Allende, a
politician who promised to expropriate all foreign holdings in Chile with
"ni un centavo" in compensation, Allende was forced to honor prior
government commitments to Kennecott.
_____1_11__1I_----
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Market Risk.
Just as in a well-functioning market a firm can lay off currency
risks at no cost and thus reduce the penalty term in the objective
function (Eq. 1), it also can arrange its financing to shift certain key
business risks to investors with sufficiently diversified portfolios to
be concerned only with the systematic component of these risks. An
example would be the silver-linked bonds issued by the Sunshine Mining
Corporation or the oil-linked bonds issued by Mexico.
Firms also may arrange their financing to influence the behavior of
other market participants so as to reduce the risks they face. For
example, some firms sell their project's or plant's expected output in
advance to their customer on the basis of mutual advantage. The
purchaser benefits by receiving a relatively stable source of supply,
usually at a discount from the market price. The seller also benefits by
having an assured outlet for its product as well as a contract which it
can then discount with a consortium of banks, i.e., it sells collection
rights on these contracts to the banks. This is quite similar to
factoring but on a far grander scale. It is also possible at times to
arrange for direct loans from customers. The cost involves not only the
interest rate on the loan, which is often relatively low, but also a
discount from the market price.
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V. EXPLOITING CAPITAL MARKET DISTORTIONS
Government credit and capital controls often lead to deviations from
the equilibrium tendencies of interest rate parity, forward parity, and
international Fisher parity. As a result, the firm may encounter
financing choices that are not fairly priced. Some of these can be
exploited through arbitrage, which requires no special forecasting
skills, but others may require speculation on uncertain future outcomes.
Further, even in the absence of government intervention, firms may be
able to identify instances where there are opportunities for arbitrage or
speculation. In fact, opportunistic financing by firms is a key factor
in assuring that the various equilibrium conditions hold. The most
consistent opportunities, though, will result either from credit and
exchange controls or explicit financial subsidies.
The condition for arbitrage is
1 + R (1 + R*) * (2)
where R and R* are the nominal interest rates in the home and foreign
currencies respectively and F and S are the forward and spot rates in
terms of direct quotes (home currency price of foreign currency).
Arbitrage opportunities are most likely between controlled or subsidized
domestic rates and freely determined offshore rates, in which case a
comparison of the two rates in a single currency is all that is necessary.
The condition for speculation is
1 + R (1 + R*) * CE(S) (3)
where CE(S) is the certaintly equivalent of the future spot rate. which
may differ from the expected spot rate if S has a non-zero systematic
--11^1-·1----- _______ __
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risk (s) or if the foreign country in question is a significant net
borrower.9 Since the expected (certainty equivalent) gain from
speculation requires taking a position, it must be traded off against the
impact of the position on the firm's total risk (a) (Eq. 1). This impact
will be given by the beta coefficient of the foreign currency position
relative to the firm's total cash flows, itself a function of the size of
the position relative to the market value of the firm's equity.
Government Credit and Capital Controls
Governments often intervene in domestic financial markets in order to
achieve goals other than economic efficiency. For example, a government
might limit corporate borrowing in order to hold down interest rates,
thereby providing its finance ministry with a low-cost source of funds to
meet a budget deficit. Or overseas investment flows may be restricted,
as they were in the United States from 1968 to 1974 under the Overseas
Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) regulations.
Where the government does restrict access to local credit markets,
local interest rates are usually at a lower-than-equilibrium level on a
risk-adjusted basis. If there is an effective offshore market for the
currency, the controls will result in a difference between domestic and
offshore rates and thus give rise to an arbitrage opportunity. The firm
can borrow in the domestic market and, to the extent that the short
position exceeds its desired passive position in that currency, the firm
can lend the same currency in offshore markets or, equivalently,
transform the short position to a position in another currency through
forward or swap transactions which will be linked to the offshore rate.
As a result, the firm should borrow as much as possible in the
credit-rationed market. In many instances, the MNC with its multiple
16
citizenship has greater access to these low-cost funds, and moreover, has
a greater ability to shift this capital elsewhere by means of its
internal financial transfer system.
If there is no offshore market, the mispriced credit can be exploited
only by taking a risk. As a result, the firm will have to trade off the
positive net present value against the effect on its total risk. As a
result, the firm will not necessarily borrow as much as possible.
Government Subsidies
Despite the often-hostile rhetoric against the multinational firm,
many governments offer incentives to MNCs to influence their production
and export sourcing decisions. Direct investment incentive include
interest rate subsidies, very long loan maturities, loan guarantees,
official repatriation guarantees, direct grants related to project size,
favorable prices for land and favorable terms for the building of
plants. Governments will also often agree to build transportation,
communications and other links to those factories. Some indirect
incentives include corporate income tax holidays, accelerated
depreciation, and a reduction or elimination of the payment of other
business taxes and import duties on capital equipment and raw
material s.10
In addition, all governments of developed nations have some form of
export financing agency whose purpose is to boost local exports by
providing long repayment periods, low interest rates and low-cost
political and economic risk insurance. These export credit programs can
often be used to advantage by multinationals. The form of use will
depend on whether the firm is looking to export or import goods or
services but the basic strategy remains the same--shop around among the
various export credit agencies for the best possible financing
_·_111__·___1_1_1____111_1______. _._ .
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arrangement.
Export Financing Strategy. Massey-Ferguson, the multinational
Canadian farm equipment manufacturer, provides a good example of how MNCs
are able to increase financial subsidies by playing off various national
export credit programs against each other.1{
The key to Massey's strategy is to view the many foreign countries in
which it has plants not only as markets but also as potential sources of
financing for exports to third countries. For example, in early 1978,
Massey-Ferguson had the opportunity to ship 7,200 tractors worth 53
million to Turkey but was unwilling to assume the risk of currency
inconvertibility. Turkey at that time already owed 2 billion to various
foreign creditors and it was uncertain whether it would be able to come
up with dollars to pay off its debts (especially since its reserves were
at about zero).
Massey solved this problem by manufacturing these tractors at its
Brazilian subsidiary, Massey-Ferguson do Brazil, and selling them to
Brazil's Interbras, the trading company arm of Petrobras, the Brazilian
national oil corporation. Interbras in turn arranged to sell the
tractors to Turkey and pay Massey in cruzeiros. The cruzeiro financing
for Interbras came from Cacex, the Banco do Brazil department that is in
charge of foreign trade. Cacex underwrote all the political, commercial,
and exchange risks as part of the Brazilian government's intense export
promotion drive. Prior to choosing Brazil as a supply point, Massey made
a point of shopping around to get the best export credit deal available.
Import Financing Strategy. Firms engaged in projects that have
sizable import requirements may be able to finance these imports with
government-funded credits. These export credits are a very desirable
Ill
18
form of financing because they usually carry low (below market) interest
rates and long repayment periods. Since these loans are almost always
tied to procurement in the agency's country, the firm needs to draw up a
list of goods and services required for the project and relate them to
potential sources country by country. Where there is overlap among the
potential suppliers, the purchasing firms may have leverage to extract
more favorable financing terms from the various export credit agencies
invol ved.
Regional and International Development Banks. Organizations such as
the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank, which are discussed
in the next section, are potential sources of low-cost, long-term,
fixed-cost funds for certain types of ventures. The time-consuming
nature of arranging financing from them, however, in part due to their
insistence on conducting their own in-house feasibility studies, usually
leaves them as a secondary source of funds. Their participation may be
indispensable, however, for projects such as roads, power plants,
schools, communications facilities, and housing for employees that
require heavy infrastructure investments. These infrastructure
investments are the most difficult part of a project to arrange financing
for because they generate no cash flow of their own. Thus, loans or
grants from an international or regional development bank are often
essential to fill a gap in the project financing plan.
Maintaining Financial Flexibility
The existence of credit or exchange controls also is a source of risk
to a finn. If the controls are effective, the finn may not be able to
obtain financing when it needs t. In order to reduce this risk and
increase its ability to exploit opportunities when they arise, the finnrm
I_ _I_ _1_ _ ___
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should seek to diversify its sources of funds.
Diversification of Fund Sources. A key element of any MNC's global
strategy should be to gain access to a broad range of fund sources, in
order to lessen its dependence on any one financial market. A side
benefit is that the firm is also able to internationalize its sources of
economic and financial information, providing a useful counterweight to
its domestic information sources and aiding in its financial
decision-making process.
An interesting example of this strategy is provided by Natomas, the
San Francisco-based oil producer. In 1977, Natomas sold a $30 million
seven-year Eurobond issue even though it could have obtained funds at a
lower cost by drawing on its existing revolving credit lines or by
selling commercial paper.
According to Natomas, the key purpose of this Euroissue was to
introduce the company's name to international investors as part of its
global financial strategy. 12 By floating a Eurobond, the firm was able
to make the acquaintance of some of the largest non-U.S. financial
institutions in the world including Swiss Bank Corp., the issue's lead
manager. Each lead underwriter was handpicked by the company with an eye
to its overall financing needs. For example, a Swiss bank was picked as
manager because Natomas felt that European banks, and Swiss banks in
particular, have greater placing power with long-term investors than U.S.
underwriters operating in Europe. In addition, these European
institutions were expected to serve Natomas as a source of market and
economic information to counterbalance the input it already was receiving
from U.S. banks.
For similar reasons, a number of Japanese firms have recently begun
20
to sell equity shares in the United States. In 1976, for example,
Pioneer raised over 27 million in the U.S. through the sale of four
million shares of Pioneer common stock. This was in keeping with its
multilateral financing strategy, designed to familiarize U.S. investors
with its name.13 In conjunction with this sale, Pioneer had previously
applied for listing of its stock on the New York Stock Exchange.
Excess Borrowing. Most firms have lines of credit with a number of
banks, given them the right to borrow up to a given credit limit. Unused
balances carry a commitment fee, normally on the order of 1/2 percent per
annum. Since these times represent a valuable call option on bank
lending if there is any chance that credit will be rationed in some
future period, most banks periodically review each credit limit to see if
the customer's account activity level justifies that credit line. Some
firms are willing to borrow funds that they don't require (and then place
them on deposit) in order to maintain their credit limit in the event of
a tight money situation. In effect, they are buying insurance against
the possibility of being squeezed out of the money market. One measure
of the cost of this policy is the difference between the borrowing rate
and the deposit rate, multiplied by the average amount of borrowed funds
placed on deposit.
_·_··il_ ·_II___ _
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VI. ESTABLISHING A WORLDWIDE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
In the three previous sections we discussed various motivations for
using particular types of financing, but while knowledge of the costs and
benefits of each individual source of funds is helpful, it is not
sufficient to establish an optimal global financial plan. This requires
consideration not only of the component costs of capital, but also of how
the use of one source affects the cost and availability of other
sources. A firm that uses too much debt might find the cost of equity
(and new debt) financing prohibitive. The capital structure problem for
the multinational enterprise, therefore, is to determine the mix of debt
and equity for the parent entity and for all consolidated and
unconsolidated subsidiaries which maximizes shareholder wealth. In this
section, we discuss the selection of a parent capital structure, the
determination of affiliate financial structures, and several related
issues including the impact of parent guarantees and consolidation on the
MNC's debt capacity.
Parent Financial Structure
For many years, ever since the appearance of the first article by
Modigliani and Miller [1958] on capital structure, there has been
controversy in the financial literature as to whether the relative
proportions of debt and equity in a company's capital structure affect
its value. We now know, thanks to Modigliani and Miller, that if the
probability distribution of corporate cash flows is independent of the
firm's capital structure, then the value of the firm is also independent
of it capital structure. The presence of taxes, bankruptcy costs, and
various agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and
control, however, does alter the distribution of future cash flows,
invalidating the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theorem.
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Taxes and Default Risk. It is generally accepted today by
academicians that an optimal capital structure does exist, particularly
when taxes and bankruptcy costs are considered. Debt should be
substituted for equity until the point at which the tax advantages of
debt are more than offset by the added costs of bankruptcy. An
indication of the likely acceptable proportions of each type of security
in the optimal capital structure can be determined by analyzing other
firms in the industry, discussions with security analysis familiar with
the industry, and an analysis of the company's ability to service debt
under various possible future scenarios.
The determination of an appropriate debt/equity level is especially
complicated for a global corporation, since it must concern itself with
the capital structures of numerous overseas affiliates and a multiplicity
of different laws and government regulations. The worldwide capital
structure, however, need not be just a residual of the decisions made in
individual subsidiaries. The parent does have the ability to offset a
highly leveraged overseas financial structure with a more conservative
home country debt policy in order to achieve a target debt-equity mix for
the firm as a whole.
We focus on the consolidated financial structure because we assume
that suppliers of capital to the multinational firm associate the risk of
default with the MNC's worldwide debt ratio. This is primarily because
bankruptcy or other forms of financial distress in an overseas subsidiary
could seriously impair the parent company's ability to operate
domestically. Any deviations from the MNC's target capital structure
will cause adjustment in the mix of debt and equity used to finance
future investments. If the perceived risk of default is affected by the
1_11^ 
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source of funds in addition to the ratio of total debt to assets,
however, then the multinational firm has a more complex optimization
problem which may allow it to discriminate monopsonistically among
lenders in different markets.
Another factor that may be relevant in establishing a worldwide debt
ratio is the empirical evidence that earnings variability appears to be a
decreasing function of foreign-source earnings.14 Since the risk of
bankruptcy for a firm is dependent on its total earnings variability, the
earnings diversification provided by its foreign operations may enable
the multinational firm to leverage itself more highly than a purely
domestic corporation, without increasing its default risk.
Agency Costs. The traditional Modigliani-Miller literature gives
little guidance regarding capital structure. This is especially true
when one considers that bankruptcy costs are relatively small and that
debt existed even in the absence of corporate income taxes.
An alternative theory of optimal capital structure, proposed by
Jensen and Meckling [19761, is based on a recognition of the problems
that arise because of the separation of ownership and control. 15 Given
this division, there is little reason to believe that managers, who serve
as agents for the owners, will always act in the best interest of the
shareholders. The agency conflict between managers and outside
shareholders, according to Jensen and Meckling, derives from two
principal sources. The first is management's tendency to itself consume
some of the firm's resources in the form of various perquisites. The
second and perhaps more important conflict arises from the fact that as a
manager's equity interest falls, his willingness to work hard and take
risks in launching new products or businesses will suffer. It is this
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entrepreneurial spirit which is the driving force in any firm and any
business that lacks it will eventually decline. Thus, as outside equity
accounts for a larger share of corporate ownership, there is a
corresponding decrease in managerial incentive, resulting in higher
agency costs.
With respect to debt, there is a similar incentive problem. Managers
(and shareholders) could expropriate the wealth of bondholders by actions
taken after the debt has been sold, which were not anticipated by
bondholders at the time they bought debt. With a highly leveraged firm,
owners will be strongly motivated to engage in highly risky projects
where they will benefit greatly if successful. If these investments pay
off, the owners gain handsomely, while if unsuccessful, the bondholders
bear most of the costs.
On the other hand, if management's income is largely derived from the
firm, management may be unduly risk-averse, passing up profitable
opportunities that the firm's shareholders would prefer to invest in.
The net result of these agency problems is that the amounts and
riskiness of future cash flows are not independent of the firm's
ownership structure. In order to minimize the agency costs, shareholders
and bondholders resort to several different devices. These include
providing incentives, such as options, to managers to act in accordance
with shareholder wealth maximization, bearing monitoring costs in the
form of audits and other surveillance methods, bonding managers so as to
limit their capacity to harm the stockholders, and including various
restrictive covenants in bond indenture provisions. Resources will be
expended on these various bonding/monitoring activities up to the point
at which the marginal costs of such activities just equal their marginal
-----"LR _ _
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benefits. As the percentage of outside equity or debt in the capital
structure rises, so do the associated agency costs. Consequently, it
pays to expend more resources to monitor corporate management. The
optimal capital structure for a given amount of outside financing is
achieved when total agency costs are minimized. This is the point at
which the marginal agency cost associated with selling additional debt
just equals the marginal agency cost of additional equity.
As we shall see, the theory of agency provides new insights into tl
issues of affiliate financial structure, parent guarantees, and joint
venture arrangements.
Subsidiary Financial Structure
A problem that has long perplexed financial executives of
multinational corporations is how to arrange the capital structures of
their foreign affiliates and what factors are relevant in making this
decision. One key question is whether subsidiary financial structures
should:
a. conform to parent company norms;
b. conform to the capitalization norms established in each counti
he
ryv
or
c. vary, so a to take advantage of opportunities to minimize the
MNC's cost of capital.
As we have already seen, a principal reason the debt/equity ratio
matters so much is because the firm's degree of leverage determines its
financial risk. What is often overlooked, however, when deciding on a
wholly-owned subsidiary's funding is that any accounting rendition of
separate capital structure for the subsidiary is illusory unless the
parent is willing to allow its affiliate to default on its debt. As
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long as the rest of the MNC group has a legal or moral obligation to
prevent the affiliate from defaulting, the individual unit has no
independent capital structure.16 Rather its true debt/equity ratio is
equal to that of the consolidated group.
The irrelevance of subsidiary financial structures is apparently
recognized by multinationals as well. In a 1979 survey by Business
International of eight U.S.-based MNCs, most of the firm expresssed
little concern with the debt-equity mixes of their foreign
affiliates. 17 One possible reason for this lack of concern is the fact
that, for most of the firms interviewed, their affiliate debt ratios had
not significantly raised their consolidated debt ratios. Again, however,
their focus was on their worldwide rather than individual capital
structures. The third alternative, therefore, to vary affiliate
financial structures so as to take advantage of local financing
opportunities, appears to be the appropriate choice. Thus, within the
constraints set by foreign statutory or minimum equity requirements and
the need to maintain a worldwide financial structure, a multinational
corporation should finance its requirements in such a manner as to
minimize its average cost of capital.
A subsidiary with a capital structure similar to its parent may miss
out on profitable opportunities to lower its cost of funds. For example,
rigid adherence to a fixed debt/equity ratio may not allow a subsidiary
to take advantage of government-subsidized debt or low-cost loans from
international agencies. Furthermore, it may be worthwhile to raise funds
locally if the country is politically risky. In the event the affiliate
is expropriated, for instance, it would default on all loans from local
financial institutions. Similarly, borrowing funds locally will decrease
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the company's vulnerability to exchange controls. Thus, highly
leveraging a subsidiary with local debt can reduce an MNC's
susceptibility to political risk. On the other hand, forcing a
subsidiary to borrow funds locally to meet parent norms may be quite
expensive in a country with a high-cost capital market. The
cost-minimizing approach would be to allow subsidiaries in low-cost
countries to exceed the parent company capitalization norm while
subsidiaries in high-cost nations would have lower target debt/equity
ratios. This assumes that capital markets are at least partially
segmented. While there are no definite conclusions on this issue at
present, the variety and degree of governmental restrictions on capital
market access lend credence to the segmentation hypothesis. In addition,
the behavior of MNCs in lobbying against regulations such a the OFDI
restrictions indicates that they believe that capital costs vary
significantly between countries.
A counterargument is that a subsidiary's financial structure should
conform to local norms. 18 Then, since German and Japanese firms are
more highly leveraged, than say, companies in the U.S. and France, the
Japanese and German subsidiaries of an American firm should have much
higher debt/equity ratios than the U.S. parent or a French subsidiary.
The problem with this argument, though, is that it ignores the strong
linkage between U.S.-based multinationals and the U.S. capital market.
Since most of their stock is owned and traded in the U.S., it follows
that the firm's target debt/equity ratio is dependent on U.S.
shareholder's risk perceptions. Similar arguments hold for
non-U.S.-based multinationals. More importantly, the level of foreign
debt/equity ratios is usually determined by institutional factors which
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have no bearing on foreign-based multinationals. For example, Japanese
and German banks own much of the equity as well as the debt issue of
local corporations. Combining the functions of stockholder and lender
may reduce the preceived risk of default on loans to captive corporations
and increase the desirability of substantial leverage. This would not
apply to a wholly-owned subsidiary. However, a joint venture with a
corporation tied into the local banking system may enable an MNC to lower
its local cost of capital by leveraging itself, without a proportional
increase in risk, to a degree that would be impossible otherwise.
The basic hypothesis that we have been proposing in this section is
that a subsidiary's capital structure is relevant only insofar as it
affects the parent's consolidated worldwide debt ratio. Despite the
logic of this argument, some companies still follow a policy of not
providing additional parent financing beyond the initial investment.
Their rationale for this policy, which is to avoid "giving local
management a crutch," can best be understood in the context of agency
theory. By forcing foreign affiliates to stand on their own feet, the
parent firm is tacitly admitting that its powers of surveillance over
foreign affiliates are limited, due to physical and/or cultural
distance. In effect, the parent is turning over some of its monitoring
responsibilities to local financial institutions. At the same time,
affiliate managers will presumably be working harder to improve local
operations, thereby generating the internal cash flow that will help
replace parent financing. The related issues of consolidation and parent
company guarantees provide additional evidence that at least some MNCs
believe that an affiliate's financial structure and its sources of funds
are important in their own right. The next section explores these issues
111____.
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at greater length.
Parent Company Guarantees and Consolidation
Multinational firms often are reluctant to explicitly guarantee the
debt of their subsidiaries even when a more advantageous interest rate
can be negotiated. Their assumption appears to be that non-guaranteed
debt would not be included in the parent company's worldwide debt ratio,
whereas guaranteed debt, as a contingent liability, would affect the
parent's debt-raising capacity.
This assumption ignores certain realities. It is very unlikely that
a parent company would allow a subsidiary to default on its debt, even if
that debt were not guaranteed. In fact, a survey by Stobaugh [1970]
showed that not one of a sample of twenty medium and large multinationals
(average foreign sales of $200 million and 1 billion annually,
respectively) would allow their subsidiaries to default on debt which did
not have a parent company guarantee. Of the small multinationals
interviewed (average annual sales of $50 million), only one out of
seventeen indicated that it would allow a subsidiary to default on its
obligations under some circumstances. A survey by Business International
[1979] had similar findings. The majority of firms interviewed said they
would make good the non-guaranteed debt of a subsidiary that defaulted on
its borrowings. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that the
multinationals feel a "moral" obligation, for very practical reasons, to
implicitly, if not explicitly, guarantee lower subsidiary borrowing
costs, it will usually be in the parent's best interest to issue such a
guarantee, provided that the parent is actually committed to making good
on its subsidiaries' debt.
It is likely that the market has already incorporated this practical
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commitment in its estimate of the parent's worldwide debt capacity. An
overseas creditor, on the other hand, may not be as certain regarding the
firm's intentions. The fact that the parent doesn't guarantee its
subsidiaries' debt may convey the information that under certain
circumstances the parent will choose to walk away from its subsidiary.
The existence of agency costs can also affect corporate policy
regarding parent guarantees. When a firm provides an affiliate with a
loan guarantee, "you lose the bank as your partner in controls" (Robbins
and Stobaugh [1973, p. 67]). Since the bank will be repaid regardless of
the affiliate's profitability, it will have less incentive to monitor the
affiliate's activities. This could lead to greater agency costs. In the
absence of a guarantee, the local bank will probably insist on inserting
various complicating covenants in its loan agreement with the
subsidiary. The parent can prevent these restrictive covenants and the
resulting loss in operational and financial flexibility by supplying loan
guarantees. The relative magnitudes of these agency costs will be a
major determinant of whether the parent guarantees its affiliates' debts
or not.
Related to this issue of parent-guaranteed debt is the belief among
some firms that do not consolidate their foreign affiliates, that
unconsolidated (and non-guaranteed) overseas debt need not affect the
MNC's debt ratio. But unless investors and analysts can be fooled
permanently, unconsolidated overseas leveraging would not allow a firm to
lower its cost of capital below the cost of capital for an identical firm
which consolidated its foreign affiliates. Any overseas debt offering
large enough to materially affect a firm's degree of leverage would very
quickly come to the attention of financial analysts.
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Some evidence of this form of market efficiency was provided through
talks with bond raters at Moody's and Standard and Poor's. Individuals
from both agencies stated that they would closely examine situations
where non-guaranteed debt issued by unconsolidated foreign affiliates
would noticeably affect a firm's worldwide debt/equity ratio. In
addition, parent company guaranteed debt is included in bond rater
analyses of a finnm's contingent liabilities, whether this debt is
consolidated or not. Thus, it appears that the growing financial
sophistication of MNCs has been paralleled by increased sophistication
among rating agencies and investors.
Joint Ventures
Since many MNCs participate in joint ventures, either by choice or
necessity, establishing an apprpriate financing mix for this form of
investment is an important consideration. Our previous assumption that
affiliate debt is equivalent to parent debt in terms of its impact of
perceived default risk may no longer be valid. This assumption was based
on the increased risk of financial distress associated with more highly
leveraged firms. However, in countries such as Japan and Germany,
increased levereage will not necessarily lead to increased financial
risks due to the close relationship between the local banks and
corporations. Thus, debt raised by a joint venture in Japan, for
example, may not be equivalent to parent-raised debt in terms of its
impact on default risk. The assessment of the effects of leverage in
joint venture is a judgmental factor which requires an analysis of the
partner's ties with the local financial community, particularly with the
local banks.
Unless the joint venture can be isolated from its partners'
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operations, there are likely to be some significant agency problems
associated with this form of ownership. Transfer pricing, establishment
of royalty and licensing fees, and allocation of production and markets
among plants are just some of the areas in which each owner has an
incentive to engage in activities that will harm its partners. This
probably explains why bringing in outside equity participants is
generally such an unstable form of external financing. Ih recognition of
their lack of complete control over a joint venture's decisions and its
profits, most MNCs will, at most, guarantee joint venture loans in
proportion to their share of ownership.
·- 
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VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have attempted to provide a framework for
multinational firms to use in arranging their global financing. We have
broken down the international aspects of the problem into three
subproblems: minimizing taxes, minimizing risks, and exploiting market
distortions. The first two of these rely on passive considerations in
that they do not rely on any superior forecasting skills, whereas the
third may or may not have an active component. In either case, these
subproblems are largely separate. Tax minimization typically can be
pursued without altering the currency risk position of the firm. Overall
risk minimization can be carried out without any special information
about capital market opportunities. Once the firm has established its
desired passive position, it then can decide by how much it is willing to
alter its risk exposures to exploit perceived bargains. Arbitrage
opportunities, of course, are simple to deal with since they have no
overall risk implications.
Following this discussion, we described how the solutions of each of
the three subproblems interact with the firm's choices of overall
financial structure. Clearly, parent and affiliate structures must be
allowed to differ if the firm is to exploit the special opportunities of
being multinational. However, it may wish to constrain the extent to
which it distorts the financing of a particular entity because of
undesired behavioral impacts on local managers, or in the case of joint
ventures, conflicts with local shareholders.
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Footnotes
1. For a review of early studies in this area see Naumann-Etienne
[1974]. More recently, Shapiro [1975] has examined the impact of
taxes on financial choices, Remmers [1980] has extended Shapiro's
work to include uncertainty, Dufey and Giddy [1978] have emphasized
the implications of efficient international financial markets for
financing choices.
2. These include Ness [1972] who incorporates various financial
constraints in a cost-minimizing linear program, Schydlowsky (in
Robbins and Stobaugh 1973]) who develops a similar model, Lietaer
[1971] who incorporates uncertainty in a quadratic programming model
but does not address taxes, and most recently Kornbluth [1981] who
stresses system versus local country capital structures but whose
treatment of currency expectations is highly simplified. Several
commercial models have been developed, but most have fallen into
disuse.
3. This breakdown of the problem follows Lessard [1979b], pp. 349-351.
4. In this paper we ignore the more complex issues of valuation in a
multicurrency, multicountry environment where different investors may
display different currency preferences. We believe that this is not
a serious problem since investors can readily offset the currency
component of a firm's equity returns in their own portfolios as long
as they know what that component is. This view outlined in Lessard
and Stulz [1982) contradicts the position taken by Wihlborg [1980].
5. Adler and Dumas 1977] employ a similar objective function.
6. Major contributions to the evolving discussion of currency risk
_  _____
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premiums include Solnik [1978, Frankel [1979], and Stulz [1981].
7. See Levi [1977] for a discussion of the simultaneous arbitrage
opportunities for investors of two countries that arise when interest
and currency movements receive differential tax treatment in each
country.
8. See Lessard [1979a] for an overview of the role of internal financial
transactions. Horst [1977] and Adler [1979] provide more in-depth
analyses on the impact of inter-affiliate financial structures on
taxes.
9. See references in note 6 above.
10. For a discussion of how these financial incentives should be
incorporated in project analyses see Lessard [1981].
11. See "Massey Ferguson's No-Risk Tractor Deal," Business International
Money Report, February 3, 1978, pp. 35-36.
12. See, for example, "Diversifying Sources of Financing," Business
International Money Report, September 23, 1977, pp. 297-298.
13. See, for example, "Why Japanese Firms Float Equity Abroad," Business
International Money Report, February 11, 1977, pp. 44-45.
14. See, for example, Cohen [1972] and Rugman (1979].
15. Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet [1981] survey this literature. See also
Fama [1981].
16. This point is made by Adler [1974] and Shapiro [1978].
17. "Policies of MNCs on Debt/Equity Mix," Business International Money
Report, September 21, 1979, pp. 319-320.
18. See, for example, Stonehill and Stitzel [1969].
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